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INTRODUCTION: UNDERSTANDING LEGAL EVOLUTION
Klaus Heine*
Questions concerning the evolution of law have always attracted the attention of 
scholars. For example, in 1897 Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote his seminal article 
‘The Path of the Law’,1 in which he clearly points to the fact that the evolution of 
law is neither arbitrary, nor can it be determined by a human mastermind. Rather, the 
evolution of law follows a path on which humans can influence the development of law, 
but cannot change its direction without running the risk that society and the economy 
end up in turmoil.
 There are other scholars who have pointed to the fact that law is not a static monolith, 
but a dynamic part of society. To mention a few well-known names, in no particular order: 
Weber,2 Durkheim,3 Dicey,4 Pound,5 Llewellyn6, Maine,7 Savigny8 and Vinogradoff.9 
 However, only recently, legal scholars, economists, sociologists and scholars from 
other disciplines have begun to explore the evolution of law in a more systematic and 
theoretically coherent way. Quantitative empirical research has also recently been 
utilised to obtain a better understanding of legal evolution.
 One prominent concept in the study of legal evolution is that of path dependency, 
which adopts Oliver Wendell Holmes’ idea that law-making can be understood as an 
ongoing process of standardisation and adaptation of legal routines. Thus, the concept 
of path dependency has become a powerful tool for the study of institutions in general, 
including informal norms, customs and culture.10 However, there is a drawback for the 
scholar who wishes to explain the evolution of law. Although path dependency is a 
useful concept, it is certainly not the only one which can be employed in order to explain 
legal development. For example, the concept of regulatory competition11 transfers 
insights from product competition to the sphere of law, and claims that the evolution of 
law can be best understood as a process of rivalry between different legal standards. At 
the end of this process, the law that prevails will be the one which provides the best cost-
benefit ratio for society. From this perspective, there is no path dependency in shaping 
law, but a continuous process of inventing and adapting law to the needs of society.12 
However, it is also possible to explain the evolution of law from a macro-sociological 
point of view. In this case the evolution of law does not depend on the aggregated will of 
individuals, but on the power and influence of larger entities in political processes. For 
example, the relative power of groups (owners of large property, the working class, or 
social, political and technocratic elites) may shape and preserve the law of society. Other 
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approaches to the understanding of legal evolution, which have different methodological 
underpinnings, also exist; for instance: anthropology, psychology, history and political 
science.13
 Importantly, in recent years, the study of legal evolution has become more 
systematic, and there have emerged various approaches to the study of legal evolution. 
However, until now, there has been no consensus as to which of these approaches is the 
most appropriate for the purposes of uncovering the mechanisms of legal evolution. 
This latter point may not be a problem if one respects different scientific views and 
believes that a variety of theoretical approaches is needed in order to fully understand 
a phenomenon. Nevertheless, the problem remains that the proponents of the different 
approaches seldom exchange their views and ideas; scholars of legal path dependency 
tend to only meet other scholars of legal path dependency, and macro-sociologists tend 
to only recognise the findings of other macro-sociologists. Interdisciplinary cross-
fertilisation remains a rather rare occurrence.
 In this issue of Erasmus Law Review, as well as the next, the latter problem is 
addressed by scholars who illustrate the use of different approaches to researching legal 
evolution. Thus, the value of this double issue of Erasmus Law Review is twofold: 
firstly, every article is an important contribution to the study of the evolution of law 
from its own methodological perspective. Secondly, this collection, which encompasses 
a variety of views on the evolution of law, allows for quick and convenient access to 
different approaches to this field of research, and therefore provides added value for the 
reader.
 The articles published in the double issue are the research output of a workshop 
(‘Understanding Legal Evolution’) that was held at the Erasmus School of Law 
(Erasmus University Rotterdam) in June 2011. Thereby the production process of the 
articles not only included in-depth research and the subsequent drafting by the authors, 
but also the engagement of highly competent commentators at the workshop. These 
commentators were: Prof. Dr. Yuwen Li (Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam), Prof. Dr. Thomas Möllers (Faculty of Law, University of Augsburg), Prof. 
Dr. Dr. h.c. Erich Schanze (Faculty of Law, University of Marburg and University of 
Bergen), Privatdozent Dr. Jan Schnellenbach (Department of Economics, University of 
Heidelberg), Prof. Dr. Wouter Veraart (Faculty of Law, VU University Amsterdam). The 
articles also underwent a double-blind peer review process – the work of the anonymous 
referees is highly appreciated. 
 A special thank-you goes to those who have made the workshop possible through 
generous funding: The Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics, the Research 
Program Behavioural Approaches to Contract and Torts at the Erasmus School of 
Law, the Erasmus School of Law and the Vereniging Trustfonds Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam.
 This brings me to the organisation of articles in this double issue of Erasmus Law 
Review. The selection of the authors was based on the idea of covering various research 
perspectives on legal evolution by bringing together specialists in their research fields. 
As a consequence, the present selection of articles is not an attempt to cover all aspects 
of legal evolution by assembling survey articles, but is designed to give an impression 
of the breadth of the discussion on legal evolution, whereby the articles fall into two 
categories – empirical papers and conceptual papers. Thus, the organising principle is 
to address the empirical papers in the first issue, and the more conceptual papers in the 
second issue. The articles will appear in the following order:
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Erasmus Law Review Vol. 4(3):
 - Nathan Betancourt/Barbara Krug: Rule Proliferation and Institutional 
Quality in the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, 1986-2009
 - Wesley Kaufmann/Arjen van Witteloostuijn: The Ecology of EU Competition 
Law: A Quantitative Analysis of Rule Dynamics and Rule Stock
Erasmus Law Review Vol. 4(4):
 - Christian Kirchner: Evolution of Law: Interplay between Private and 
Public Rule-making
 - Hans-Jürgen Wagener: How does Good Governance Come about? On 
Evolution of Institutions
 - Elaine Mak: Understanding Legal Evolution through Constitutional 
Theory: The Concept of Constitutional (In-)Flexibility
The paper by Betancourt and Krug is concerned with the relatively new bankruptcy 
law of the People’s Republic of China. The authors examine the degree to which the 
proliferation of bankruptcy provisions, as opposed to the elaboration of the statute, 
affects organisational compliance with the bankruptcy law. To answer this question 
the authors undertake a state of the art empirical legal analysis. Thereby many factors 
are identified which may influence the direction and the progress of legal evolution in 
general. Kaufmann and van Witteloostuijn use an ecological approach, which posits 
that, apart from external pressures, an internal dynamic is a key driver for the production 
of legal rules. With the example of European competition law they can show that an 
ecological approach is not only a strong empirical approach in organization science, but 
that it can be applied also fruitfully to the study of legal evolution. The paper by Kirchner 
elaborates on the interplay between private and public rule-making, making clear that 
legal evolution can only be understood, if both domains of law are considered in parallel. 
Wagener asks “how does good governance come about?” He examines the possibilities 
and constrains of politics to influence legal evolution towards better institutions, from 
which society benefits as a whole. Eventually, Mak analyzes legal evolution from the 
perspective of constitutional theory. She argues that constitutional theory provides a 
framework for a better understanding of why institutions of government develop 
differently in western democracies. 
 In summary, the contributions to this and the next issue of Erasmus Law Review 
provide a broad insight to the evolution of law, based on their various disciplinary 
backgrounds.

